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Recent Cases
Recreational Use
Statute Immunized
Landowners From
Liability for Personal
Injuries
In Larini v. Biomass Industries,
Inc., 918 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1990),
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that
New York's recreational use statute, N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 9-103
(McKinney 1988), immunized a
landowner from liability to an injured snowmobiler.
Background
On February 19, 1980, Biomass
Industries, Inc. ("Biomass") purchased approximately nine hundred acres of undeveloped wilderness in Windham, New York. Two
years later, Biomass subdivided
the property and improved the
access road. As part of the road
improvements, Biomass placed a
drainage pipe under the road to
channel water from an adjacent
pond. This drainage pipe created a
stream bed seven to nine feet below the road level.
Upon completion of the subdivision and the road improvements,
Biomass offered some of the lots
for public sale. Prior to March 1,
1986, an authorized real estate
agent provided Keith Larini ("Larini") with a site plan, price quotations, and a viewing of the available lots.
In the early evening of March 1,
1986, without the permission of
the real estate agent or a Biomass
representative, Larini rode a snowmobile along the access road to
view the specific lot which he was
interested in purchasing. Biomass
had blocked the access road entrance with a metal gate and a wall
of snow. Biomass also had posted
"No Trespassing" signs along the
unplowed road. Nevertheless, Larini entered the subdivision.
As Larini travelled along the
access road, he decided to drive off
the roadway toward the stream
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bed. As he drove into the stream
bed, Larini was thrown from his
snowmobile and landed against the
embankment. Larini suffered serious personal injuries from the accident.
Subsequently, Larini and his
wife, Sally (the "Larinis"), sued
Biomass in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York to recover damages for Larini's injuries.
District Court Proceedings
In the district court, Biomass
moved for summary judgment.
Biomass claimed that it was immune from liability under the New
York recreational use statute, N.Y.
Gen. Oblig. Law § 9-103 (McKinney 1988). On March 16, 1990, the
district court held that the statute
applied and granted Biomass's motion for summary judgment. The
Larinis appealed the dismissal to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
Second Circuit Opinion
Recreational Use Statute
The New York legislature originally enacted § 9-103 to encourage
landowners to make their property
available for specified recreational
activities such as fishing, hunting,
and trapping. Through amendments, the legislature expanded the
specified activities to include hiking, horseback riding, and snowmobiling. The statute provided in
part that an owner of certain recreational property was immune from
liability to others for personal injuries occurring on the recreational
property unless: (1) for consideration, the landowner granted a
party permission to take part in a
specified recreational activity on
his land; or (2) the landowner
willfully or maliciously failed to
guard or warn against a dangerous
condition on his land. N.Y. §
9-103(2)(a), (b) (McKinney 1988).
First, the Larinis argued that the
statute should not apply. Alternatively, they argued that if the statute did apply, Biomass was liable

under either the consideration exception or the willful or malicious
conduct exception. Finally, the
Larinis argued that the common
law duty of reasonable care applied
inthis case.
Applicability of Statutory Immunity
The Larinis argued that the statute was inapplicable to immunize
Biomass, as Biomass violated the
purpose of the statute. The statute's purpose was to encourage
access to recreational lands by limiting liability to landowners. The
Larinis argued that Biomass tried
to prevent public access to the
property when it posted "No Trespassing" signs and placed blockades at the front entrance of the
subdivision. Because Biomass acted inconsistently with the purpose
of the statute, the Larinis contended that Biomass should not be
immunized from liability.
The court rejected the Larinis'
argument. The court found that
although Biomass sealed off the
access road, the property was still
accessible and remained useable
for several of the statute's enumerated activities.
The Larinis next argued that the
property did not fall within the
scope of the recreational use statute; the property was not physically conducive to snowmobiling because it contained numerous
obstacles such as trees, stone walls,
and a pond.
The court rejected the Larinis'
argument. The court found that the
property was very appealing to
snowmobilers and that the obstacles only added to the attractiveness of the undeveloped woodlands. Thus, the court concluded
that the property was conducive to
snowmobiling and was of a type
generally appropriate for recreational snowmobiling by the public. The court held that the property fell within the scope of the
statute.
Consideration Exception
The Larinis also argued that
Biomass was liable under the statVolume 3 Number 3/Spring, 1991
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ute's consideration exception,
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 9-103(2)(b)
(McKinney 1988). Under the consideration exception, if Biomass
gave Larini permission to ride a
snowmobile along the access road
in exchange for some form of consideration, Biomass would be liable to Larini for his injuries. The
Larinis urged the court to accept an
"indirect consideration" theory as
a basis for applying the exception.
Under such a theory, the Larinis
argued that since Larini was a
potential purchaser of a lot in the
subdivision, Biomass anticipated
receiving consideration from him.
The court refused to apply the
consideration exception to the Larinis, noting that no New York
court had ever found any form of
indirect consideration sufficient to
satisfy the exception. In addition
to consideration, the exception expressly required the injured party
to demonstrate that he had permission to use the landowner's recreational property. Larini admitted
that he did not have express or
even implied permission to enter
the property without a real estate
agent or a Biomass representative
or to ride a snowmobile on the
property. Therefore, the court noted that even if it adopted the
"indirect consideration" theory,
the Larinis' argument would fail.
Willful Or Malicious Conduct Exception
The Larinis then alleged that
Biomass was liable under the willful or malicious conduct exception,
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 9-103(2)(a)
(McKinney 1988), due to its failure
to erect guardrails and warnings
around the drop-off leading to the
drainage ditch and stream bed.
The exception imposed liability
upon the landowner for willful or
malicious failure to guard or warn
against a dangerous condition. The
court rejected this argument as
well. The Larinis failed to prove
that Biomass intentionally and unreasonably failed to issue warnings
regarding an obvious risk. The
court noted that the road on which
Larini travelled posed no danger to
those who used it for its usual and
ordinary purpose; Biomass could
not reasonably be required to mark
off-road obstacles.
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Common Law Liability
Finally, the Larinis argued that
the common law liability of a landlord applied in this case. The Larinis argued that Biomass was liable
under the reasonable care standard
because Biomass could have reasonably expected the public to enter the property and to sustain
injury because of the nature of the
hidden drop-off.
The court rejected the Larinis'
application of the common law
duty of reasonable care. The court
noted that in situations covered by
the recreational use statute, the
statute's standard of willful or malicious conduct constituted the single standard applicable.
Finding no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the Larinis' claim, the court affirmed the
district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Biomass.
Rosemary G. Milew

Evidence of Side
Agreement Between
Lender and Borrower
Not Admissible To Show
Modification of Loan
Agreement
In Hall v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 920 F.2d 334 (6th Cir.
1990), the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the D'Oench
doctrine barred an action by a
borrower against a failed savings
and loan association for breach of a
loan agreement. The D'Oench doctrine protected the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (the
"FDIC") by excluding evidence of
secret agreements modifying loan
agreements made between the
failed lending institution and its
former customers.
Background
R. Vance Burkey and M.D.
Kelly ("Burkey and Kelly") owned
B & K Enterprises, Inc. ("B & K"),
a corporation which constructed a
motel in Knoxville, Tennessee. In
order to finance the motel's construction, Burkey and Kelly obtained a $1,000,000 loan from
United American Bank of Knox-

ville ("UAB"); UAB took a first
priority lien in the motel units. B &
K subsequently defaulted on the
UAB loan and advertised the units
for sale. Lillian H. Hall and William L. Hall ("the Halls") and
Brenda C. Gibson and Wallace G.
Gibson ("the Gibsons") answered
the advertisement. Burkey and
Kelly, the Halls, and the Gibsons
formed the Jackson, Tennessee
Motel Partnership ("the partnership") and agreed to obtain another loan to pay off the UAB debt and
move the motel to Jackson, Tennessee.
In January 1983, the Halls and
the Gibsons entered into a loan
agreement with Commerce Federal
Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
("Commerce") which provided
that Commerce would lend them
$1.85 million in exchange for a
first priority security interest in the
motel units. Burkey and Kelly
served as guarantors on the loan.
The partnership allegedly believed UAB would also be involved
in the new loan with Commerce.
Commerce and UAB had agreed
that UAB would participate in the
Commerce loan, a fact confirmed
in a letter signed by the two lenders. However, the two lenders had
not entered a formal participation
agreement at the time the partnership closed the loan with Commerce. The loan agreement between the partnership and
Commerce stated that Commerce
would not be obligated to fund
more than $750,000 if UAB failed
to participate in the loan agreement. At the closing with Commerce, the partnership signed a
security agreement which gave
Commerce a security interest in all
personal property and gave Commerce an interest in the motel land
through execution of a deed of
trust in favor of Commerce. Commerce then disbursed $200,000.00
to the partnership as a first draw on
the loan.
In February 1983, Commerce
refused to fund the loan further
because the partnership had failed
to give Commerce a first priority
lien on the units, in accordance
with the loan agreement. The partnership stopped construction on
the motel. Unpaid subcontractors
(continued on page 102)
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